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CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OVER TITLE VII
ACTIONS
State courts and federal courts generally possess concurrent jurisdiction
over actions arising under federal statutes and the federal constitution.' The
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction provides that a potential litigant seeking
relief under a federal statute may have the right to pursue such relief in
1. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (state courts
enjoy a presumptive right to hear federal claims); General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 228
(1908) (state courts have jurisdiction over actions involving rights granted under the United
States Constitution); see also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (state courts
and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over suits arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983),
reh'g. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800, 806-09 (1976) (state courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of 28
U.S.C. § 1345 actions); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 331 (1966) (state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal bankruptcy courts of necessary plenary suits initiated to recover
preferences); Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 (1962) (state courts and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction of 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) actions); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v.
Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 130 (1915) (state courts generally have concurrent
jurisdiction with federal courts of claims arising under Interstate Commerce Act); Mondou v.
New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1912) (state courts and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over claims arising under Federal Employers' Liability Act).
In Claflin v. Houseman, the United States Supreme Court established that a state court
could adjudicate a claim arising under a federal statute unless Congress expressly provided for
exclusive federal court jurisdiction of the federal statute or clear incompatibility existed between
the exercise of concurrent state court jurisdiction and the furtherance of federal interests. 93
U.S. 130, 137-38 (1876). The Claflin Court based the presumptive right of state courts to hear
federal statutory causes of action on both the comments of one of the framers of the United
States Constitution and the language found in article III, section 1 and article VI, section 2 of
the United States Constitution. See id. at 136-38 (laws of United States bind state citizens and
state courts); Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75
MICH. L. REV. 311, 314 (1976) (suggesting that Claflin Court implicitly based holding of
presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction of federal claims in part on article III, § 2
of Constitution). The Claflin Court noted that Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of the
Constitution, advocated the existence of concurrent state court and federal court jurisdiction of
federal statutory claims. Claflin, 93 U.S. at 138 (1876). Alexander Hamilton suggested that
allowing both state courts and federal courts the right to adjudicate federal claims would help
the federal government and the states to work together as parts of one whole governmental
system. THE FEDERAUST No. 82 (A. Hamilton). Hamilton suggested, therefore, that state courts
should have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over any action arising under a federal
statutory law unless Congress expressly restricted jurisdiction of the action to federal courts.
Id. Article III, section I of the Constitution gave Congress the option of whether to create
federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court to adjudicate federal causes of action. U.S. CoNsT.
art III, § 1. The framers of the Constitution and the language of article III, section I of the
Constitution, therefore, contemplated the possibility that the Supreme Court would be the only
federal court, or at least that Congress would not create an extensive federal judicial system.
See Redish & Muench, supra at 314 (analyzing rationale underlying holding of Claflin v.
Houseman that state courts have a presumptive right to adjudicate federal causes of action).
Consequently, the framers of the Constitution probably expected that Congress would leave
adjudication of federal statutory claims largely in the hands of state courts. Id. Furthermore,
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either federal court or in state court.2 An important issue arising from the
general rule that state courts can hear federal statutory claims is whether
concurrent jurisdiction extends to adjudication of employment discrimination
the Claflin Court suggested that once a state court had jurisdiction to discern and enforce rights
arising under a federal statute, the only limitation placed upon the power of the state court to
adjudicate the claim of the federal statutory right was the requirement that the state courts
follow any applicable Supreme Court decisions or possible lower federal court case law when
resolving the action. See Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136-37 (laws of United States bind state courts).
The idea that state courts must follow applicable and constitutionally valid federal court law
derives from article VI, section 2 of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Article VI,
section 2 of the Constitution provides that the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United
States take precedence over contrary state laws. Id. Supreme Court decisions and lower federal
court determinations of alleged rights arising under federal statutes comprise a part of the laws
of the United States mentioned in article VI, § 2 of the Constitution. See Dowd Box Co., Inc.
v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 514 (1962) (state courts fashioning relief in 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
actions must apply federal common law). In sum, the Claflin Court based its decision that state
courts enjoyed a presumptive right to hear actions arising under federal statutes on the writing
of Alexander Hamilton and on principles embodied in Articles three and six of the United
States Constitution. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 45, at 268-69 & nn.3-4 (4th
ed. 1983) (discussing relationship of article III, § 2 of Constitution and Alexander Hamilton's
writing in analyzing state enforcement of federal law).
Several commentators have questioned directly or indirectly the wisdom behind affording
state courts a presumptive right to hear actions arising under federal statutes. See, e.g.,
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS, 166-67 (1969) (state judges generally are not aware of intricacies of federal
substantive law); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in The District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
157, 158-60 (1953) (federal court judges, unlike state judges, are free from local prejudice and
are more likely than state judges to follow Supreme Court decisions and to help formulate
uniform national law concerning interpretation and enforcement of federal statutes); Redish &
Muench, supra, at 314-15 (lack of state judges' expertise in dealing with federal law and need
for uniformity in adjudging federal statutory claims caution against allowing state courts a
presumptive right to resolve federal issues). The Supreme Court, however, continues to hold
that state courts enjoy a presumptive right to hear actions arising under federal statutes. See
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (only explicit statutory
language, unmistakable implication from legislative history, or clear incompatibility between
exercise of state court jurisdiction and furtherance of federal policy interests rebuts presumption
of state court jurisdiction of dispute arising under federal statute); infra note 9 (discussing facts
and holding of Gulf).
2. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 268 (unless Congress directs otherwise, state courts
can hear action based on federal claim). State courts often have the right to adjudicate actions
arising under federal statutes. See supra note 1 (citing cases in which state courts enjoyed right
to hear actions arising under federal statutes). The state of the law, however, is uncertain
concerning whether state courts are obligated to hear actions arising under federal statutes. See
16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §
4024, at 716-24 (Supp. 1985) (discussing various Supreme Court cases that have addressed issue
of whether state court must hear federal causes of action when the state court has concurrent
jurisdiction over action) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. In Mondou v. New York,
New Haven, & Hartford R.R. Co., the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff had the right to
use state courts to enforce claims arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 223 U.S.
1, 57-58 (1912). The Mondou Court reasoned that congressional statutes establish a policy for
all states, and that a state court, absent legislative direction to the contrary, would have to
adjudicate claims arising under the federal statute just as the state court would have to adjudicate
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claims arising under acts emanating from the state legislature. Id. In Douglas v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., however, the Supreme Court ruled that a state court could
refuse to hear a Federal Employers' Liability Act claim if the refusal to entertain the claim
derived from application of nondiscriminatory rules of forum non conveniens. 279 U.S. 377,
387-88 (1929). The doctrine of forum non conveniens provides that a court having jurisdiction
over the litigants and the cause of action can dismiss the action if another forum also has
jurisdiction over the litigants and the action. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-
09 (1947) (doctrine of forum non conveniens is available for use in federal courts). In general,
a court can dismiss the action only if bringing suit in the other forum would be more convenient
overall for the litigants and witnesses, and only if the dismissal would not inhibit greatly the
furtherance of justice. See 15 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, at § 3828 (discussion of doctrine of
forum non conveniens). The Douglas Court reasoned that New York State's forum non
conveniens statute did not discriminate in favor of citizens of New York as opposed to citizens
of other states because the statute afforded privileges only according to residency and not
according to state citizenship. Douglas, 279 U.S. 377, 387-88; see La Tourette v. McMaster,
248 U.S. 465, 467-70 (1919) (holding that rational considerations may permit states to distinguish
privileges according to residency). The message derived from the Douglas holding was that a
state court having jurisdiction over a federal statutory claim could not refuse to adjudicate the
action if the attempted refusal would result in discrimination against the federal claim. See
McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934). In McKnett, a
Tennessee citizen brought a Federal Employers' Liability Act suit in Alabama. Id. at 230. The
Alabama courts based dismissal on the ground that Alabama statutory law permitted state court
jurisdiction of the claim if the claim had accrued under Tennessee law, but that the same
statutory law denied state court jurisdiction of the claim since the claim arose under federal
law. Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissals and remanded the case to the
Alabama court system for readjudication. Id. at 233-34. In reversing the Alabama courts, the
Supreme Court held that a state acts unconstitutionally when the state discriminates against
rights arising under federal law, and that denying jurisdiction simply because of the federal
source of the law upon which plaintiff based his claim therefore was unconstitutional. Id.
In Testa v. Kati, the Supreme Court appeared to discard the nondiscriminatory dismissal
standard enunciated in McKnett by suggesting that state courts could not refuse to enforce a
federal claim over which the state cqurts had jurisdiction. See 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (Rhode
Island courts required to enforce federal penal statute). But see 16 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, §
4024, at 718 (Testa opinion cryptic and capable of dual interpretation either of mandating state
court adjudication of federal statutory claims or of permitting state court to dismiss case if
dismissal does not discriminate against federal claim).
In Martinez v. California, the Supreme Court offered a somewhat cryptic test for a state
court to use in determining whether the state court could refrain from adjudicating a federal
claim over which the state court had jurisdiction. See 444 U.S. 277, 283 & n.7 (1980) (holding
that state court could adjudicate actions arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983), reh'g denied, 445
U.S. 920 (1980). The Martinez Court stated that state courts possessing concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts over a federal claim generally cannot refuse to adjudicate the claim when
the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforceable in state courts. Id. The
Martinez Court, however, did not list guidelines concerning which factors would satisfy the
"same type of claim" standard. Id.
Research has uncovered no application of the Martinez same type of claim test to actions
arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See infra note 3 (defining Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964). The Supreme Court case of Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., however, provides some guidance. See 453 U.S. 473, 477-78, 488 (1981) (holding that
state courts can adjudicate actions arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act). In
Gulf, the Court outlined a test for courts to use when determining whether a state court could
exercise jurisdiction over an action arising under a federal statute. Id. at 478; see infra notes
10-172 and accompanying text (discussing application of Gulf concurrent jurisdiction test to
question of whether state courts can adjudicate Title VII claims). The Gulf Court noted,
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suits brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 Exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction significantly affects litigants participating in Title VII
however, that the Gulf test only addressed the issue of whether a state court might assume
jurisdiction of a claim arising under a federal statute. Gulf, 453 U.S. at 477-78. Nowhere in
the Gulf opinion did the Court require a state court having jurisdiction over an action arising
under a federal statute to exercise that jurisdiction. See id. at 473-88 (no mention of whether
state courts possessing concurrent jurisdiction over federal statutory claims are obligated to
exercise that jurisdiction when plaintiff files suit based on the federal claim in state court).
No state or federal courts that have addressed the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue
after Gulf have considered whether the exercise of such jurisdiction is mandatory. See Valenzuela
v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 434-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over Title VII claims); Greene v. County Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43, 43-45 (E.D. Va. 1981) (federal
courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims). Furthermore, only
one state court addressing the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue prior to Gulf acknowledged
but declined to exercise its jurisdiction over a Title VII claim. See Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd.
of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 74-75, 389 A.2d 465, 474-75 (1978) (dismissing Title VII suit because
plaintiff did not follow prelitigation Title VII administrative procedures). Given that the Gulf
opinion did not contain language mandating state courts with jurisdiction over a federal cause
of action to exercise that jurisdiction, three results concerning the Title VII concurrent
jurisdiction issue are possible. First, if a state court does possess jurisdiction over a Title VII
action, the state court may still decline to exercise that jurisdiction. See Gulf, 453 U.S. at 477-
78 (stating only that state courts might assume jurisdiction over federal statutory claims absent
certain circumstances). Second, a state court contemplating whether to refuse to hear a federal
cause of action over which the state court has jurisdiction will have to apply the Martinez same
type test on a case by case basis to determine whether the Title VII claim sufficiently parallels
a similar state law. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (containing dictum
noting that state court cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over federal claim if same type of
claim arising under state law is enforceable in state court), reh'g. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
Alternatively, if state courts do not enjoy jurisdiction over Title VII claims, the Martinez same
type test would not apply. See id. (discussing only whether state court already possessing
jurisdiction over federal claim could refuse to adjudicate the claim). But see infra notes 10-172
and accompanying text (suggesting that state courts possess jurisdiction of Title VII claims
concurrent with federal court jurisdiction of Title VII claims).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e3-17 (1982). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits employers of fifteen or more employees, labor organizations, and employment agencies
from discriminating in employment practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) (employers employing less than fifteen employees
not subject to coverage under Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) to 2000e-2(d) (1982) (employers,
labor organizations and state agencies violate Title VII if they discriminate in employment
practices on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). Under Title VII, Congress
established an intricate enforcement scheme for plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination
practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (establishing intricate enforcement scheme
for plaintiffs seeking redress of alleged employment discrimination practices). The plaintiff first
must file a charge of unlawful employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful
employment practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(e) (1982). If, however, the
plaintiff seeking relief for the alleged unlawful employment practice instituted proceedings with
a state or local agency possessing authority to afford or seek relief for such practice, the
plaintiff must adhere to a different schedule for filing his employment discrimination charge.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982). Under section 2000e-5(e), a plaintiff who first filed his
employment discrimination charge with the appropriate state or local agency must file an
employment discrimination charge with the EEOC within three hundred days of the occurrence
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actions by allowing parties to avoid multiple suits, to control costly attorney's
fees, to benefit from increased judicial efficiency, and to have a fair
of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or within thirty days of receiving notice from the
state or local agency of the termination of state or local law proceedings. Id. Under section
2000e-5(c) of Title 42 of the United States Code, if the plaintiff did not first file his employment
discrimination charge with an existent appropriate state or local agency, the EEOC must refer
the employment discrimination charge received from the plaintiff to the state or local employ-
ment discrimination agency for at least sixty days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982). After passage
of the sixty day state agency grace period, or after the termination of state proceedings,
whichever comes first, the plaintiff may file or refile his employment discrimination charge with
the EEOC. Id. The EEOC then determines whether reasonable cause exists to support a finding
that the alleged discriminatory employment practice violated Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(1982). The EEOC determination of reasonable cause must give substantial weight to the
findings of state agencies concerning rulings on alleged violations of state antidiscrimination
employment laws. Id.
If no reasonable cause exists to support a finding that the alleged discriminatory
employment practice violated Title VII, the EEOC must dismiss the charge. Id. Alternatively,
if the EEOC finds that reasonable cause supporting the charge exists, the EEOC must attempt
to expunge the alleged discriminatory employment practice through informal negotiation between
the plaintiff, the EEOC, and the alleged discriminator. Id. If, after thirty days of the EEOC's
finding of reasonable cause, negotiations to ameliorate the alleged discriminatory practice prove
unsuccessful, the EEOC may bring a court action to enforce the Title VII claim. Id. The court
usually admits the EEOC's finding of reasonable cause into evidence. Compare Bradshaw v.
Zoological Soc'y., 569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1978) (district court must admit EEOC
determination of reasonable cause into evidence) and Smith v. Universal Servs., Inc., 454 F.2d
154, 158 (5th Cir. 1972) (failure of district court to admit EEOC finding on reasonable cause
constituted reversible error) with Francis-Sobel v. University of Maine, 597 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir.
1979) (exclusion from evidence of EEOC findings on reasonable cause was not abuse of court
discretion), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979) and Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d
Cir. 1977) (district court acted within its discretion when refusing to admit EEOC's findings
into evidence). The weight given to the EEOC findings, however, is within the discretion of the
judge. See Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y., 569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1978) (district court
has discretion to determine weight to which EEOC finding of reasonable cause entitled); ' Spray
v. Kellos-Sims Crane Rental, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 745, 750 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (according EEOC
finding on reasonable cause same weight as any other testimony); Fearrington v. American
Indem. Co., 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1538, 1539 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (evidentiary weight
of EEOC findings was less than controlling).
If the EEOC fails to act or dismisses the charge within one hundred and eighty days of
receiving the charge when no appropriate state or local employment discrimination agency
existed, or within one hundred and eighty days after terminations of state proceedings or after
culmination of the sixty day state agency grace period when such a state agency existed, the
EEOC must notify the plaintiff of the EEOC's inaction or dismissal of the charge. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(I) (1982). The EEOC's notification to the plaintiff must include a right to sue
notice. Id. The right to sue notice merely notes the EEOC's decision not to proceed to court
with the charge and acknowledges the plaintiff's right to bring a private Title VII court action
against the party named in the charge. See Evans v. McCluskey, 567 F.2d 755, 757 (8th Cir.
1977) (EEOC does not have duty to inform plaintiff in right to sue notice of change of
ownership of corporate employer), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 867 (1978). The plaintiff, however,
cannot bring a private action to enforce a Title VII claim unless the plaintiff has received a
right to sue notice prior to the filing of the court action. See Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1010 (l1th Cir. 1982) (defendant seeking to bar Title VII action on
grounds that plaintiff did not receive right to sue notice must state specifically in pleadings that
1985] 1407
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adjudication on the merits of Title VII claims. 4 The United States Supreme
Court has not addressed the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue.' Fur-
thermore, the few federal and state courts that have analyzed the Title VII
plaintiff did not receive the right to sue notice); Stebbins v. Continental Ins. Cos., 442 F.2d
843, 845-46 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (lack of right to sue notice barred plaintiff from bringing Title
VII suit based on alleged racial discrimination ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1107 (1977). But see
Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir. 1982) (plaintiffs' reception of right
to sue notice after filing of court action but four months before commencement of trial did not
bar Title VII action).
4. See infra notes 115-66 and accompanying text (discussing policy interests associated
with Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue).
5. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 479 n.20 (1982). The Kremer Court
refrained from deciding whether federal courts and state courts enjoyed concurrent jurisdiction
over Title VII claims or instead whether federal courts alone had exclusive jurisdiction of Title
VII claims. Id.; see infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text (indepth discussion of Kremer
opinion). In Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co., however, the Supreme Court addressed
tangentially the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue. See 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). The Alexander
Court held that collective bargaining agreement arbitration which rejected an employee's claim
of an alleged discriminatory employment practice did not bar the employee from subsequently
pursuing a Title VII action. Id. at 51-52. Additionally, the Alexander Court listed a number of
forums available to an aggrieved party seeking Title VII relief for alleged employment discrim-
ination. Id. at 47. The list included the EEOC, state and local agencies, and federal courts. Id.
The Alexander Title VII forum list, however, did not mention state courts. Id. Two courts that
have attempted to resolve the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue have put great weight on
the absence of state courts from the Alexander Title VII forum list. See Valenzuela v. Kraft,
Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1984) (absence of state courts from Alexander Title VII forum
list, combined with statutory language and legislative history analysis of Title VII, lead to
conclusion that federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII claims reaching court
stage); Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (same). Two
other courts attempting to resolve the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue, however, found
that the dictum of the Alexander Title VII forum list did not suggest the existence of exclusive
federal court jurisdiction of Title VII claims. See Greene v. County Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43, 44-
45 (E.D. Va. 1981) (state courts and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction of Title VII
actions); Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1322, 1323 (W.D.
Tex. 1979) (holding of concurrent jurisdiction of Title VII claims based in part upon existence
of concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights §§ 1982 and 1983). The Greene court interpreted the
Alexander Court dictum as referring only to exclusivity of remedies obtained under Title VII
and the requirement of exhausting state remedies. Greene v. County Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43, 44
(E.D. Va. 1981). An examination of the Alexander dictum supports the Greene court's
interpretation of that dictum. The Alexander Court did not say that the Title VII forum list
was exhaustive. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 (no language unequivocally stating that Supreme
Court limited Title VII forums solely to EEOC, state and local agencies, and federal court).
Moreover, in dictum immediately following the Title VII forum list, the Alexander Court
emphasized both that submission of an employment discrimination claim to one forum would
not bar a later submission of the claim to another forum and that Congress did not intend Title
VII remedies to be the only relief available for employment discrimination. See id. at 47-48 &
n.9 (emphasizing Congress' efforts to avoid making Title VII the exclusive remedy for employ-
ment discrimination).
The Peterson court emphasized the equivocal wording of the Title VII concurrent
jurisdiction issue dictum found in Alexander and held that such dictum was'insufficient to rebut
the traditional presumption of state court jurisdiction over actions arising under federal statutes.
See Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1322, 1323 (W.D. Tex.
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concurrent jurisdiction issue are divided concerning whether to limit court
adjudication of Title VII claims exclusively to federal courts.
6
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the Title VII concurrent
jurisdiction issue, the Court has formulated a general three part test for
determining whether a state court may exercise jurisdiction over a particular
1979) (allowing plaintiff to maintain state court Title VII action for alleged racial employment
discrimination); see also supra note 1 (discussing historical development of traditional presump-
tion that state courts generally enjoy jurisdiction over federal causes of action). Given the
divergent lower court interpretations of the Alexander dictum and the Kremer Court's specific
refusal to decide the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue, the issue remains open and merits
further analysis.
6. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing several
courts that either held for or against right of state court to adjudicate Title VII claims). Courts
denying state courts jurisdiction over Title VII actions suggest that Supreme Court dictum,
combined with Title VII's statutory language and legislative history, demonstrate a congressional
intent to place Title VII actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. See, e.g.,
Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (Title VII statutory language
directing use of federal rules of civil procedure demonstrates congressional intent to place Title
VII actions within exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts); Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F.
Supp. 43, 46-48 & n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (legislative history of Title VII and Supreme Court
dictum relating to Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue lead to conclusion that Congress
intended to deny state courts concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions); McCloud v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 513, 514-15 (D.D.C. 1981)
(following precedent emphasizing congressional intent through Title VII statutory language to
confine jurisdiction of Title VII actions exclusively to federal courts); Lucas v. Tanning Bros.
Contracting Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1104, 1104 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1974) (statutory
language of Title VII reveals congressional intent to deny state court jurisdiction over Title VII
actions); Bowers v. Woodward & Lothrop, 280 A.2d 772, 774 (D.C. 1971) (stating without
explanation that statutory language of Title VII Requires denial of state court jurisdiction of
Title VII actions); Fox v. Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 237, 358 N.E.2d 536, 537 (1976)
(holding that § 2000e-5(f)3 of Title VII unequivocally precludes state courts from hearing Title
VII actions); see also supra note 5 (discussing relation of Supreme Court dictum to Title VII
concurrent jurisdiction issue). Courts granting state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions
emphasize that the statutory language and legislative history of Title VII do not provide strong
enough support to rebut the traditional presumption of the right of state courts to hear federal
causes of action. See, e.g., Greene v. County Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43, 44-45 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(Supreme Court dictum and legislative history of Title VII did not address Title VII concurrent
jurisdiction issue); Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1279-80 (D.N.J. 1976)
(statutory language of Title VII restricts EEOC from bringing Title VII action in state court
against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, but does not otherwise
deny state court jurisdiction of Title VII actions); Salem v. LaSalle High School, 31 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 10, 10-11 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (statutory language of Title VII does not require
federal courts either expressly or impliedly to retain exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII actions);
Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 20 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1322, 1323 (W.D. Tex.
1979) (neither statutory language of Title VII nor past Supreme Court dictum rebut presumption
that state court should possess jurisdiction over Title VII action); Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd.
of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 74, 389 A.2d 465, 474-75 (1978) (statutory section of Title VII covering
jurisdiction does not preclude state court from adjudicating Title VII action); see also supra
note 5 (discussing Supreme Court dictum related to Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue).
Additionally, courts affording state courts jurisdiction over Title VII actions often stress that
other civil rights statutes already permitting concurrent jurisdiction embody federal interests
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federal statutory claim.7 Under the criteria set forth in the Supreme Court
decision of Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,8 only explicit statutory
language, unmistakable implication from legislative history, or clear incom-
patibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests will bar a
party from pursuing a claim arising under a federal statute in state court. 9
Analysis of Title VII under the Gulf test suggests that state courts should
have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII disputes.
Under the Gulf test, a court first must examine the actual language of
the particular federal statute to determine whether that language exhibits an
similar to federal interests found in Title VII. See Salem v. LaSalle High School, 31 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 10, 10-11 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which state courts and
federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction, and Title VII embody similar purposes); Peterson
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1322, 1323 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (holding
of concurrent jurisdiction of Title VII claims based in part upon existence of concurrent
jurisdiction afforded under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 & 1982). Some courts therefore reason that
concurrent jurisdiction existent for other civil rights statutes suggests congressional acquiescence
to concurrent jurisdiction of Title VII actions because Title VII actions and concurrent
jurisdiction civil rights statutes embody similar federal interests. See Salem, 31 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 10-11 (42 U.S.C. § 1983, over which state courts have jurisdiction, and Title VII
both embody federal interest of curbing discriminatory treatment); Peterson, 20 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1323 (since Supreme Court has granted concurrent jurisdiction over civil
rights actions 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 & 1983, concurrent jurisdiction should exist for Title VII).
7. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) (establishing
three part test for courts to use when determining whether to extend jurisdiction over a federal
statutory claim to state courts).
8. 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
9. Id. at 478. The Supreme Court decision of Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.
grew out of a personal injury action arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Land Act
(OCSLA) and based on incorporated state law. Id. at 476-77 & n.7; see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1356 (1982) (OSCLA) (legislation asserting United States ownership, jurisdiction and regulation
over minerals in and under continental shelf including regulation of artificial islands and fixed
structures erected on continental shelf); 43 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (when federal law pertaining to
claim arising under OSCLA is incomplete, courts adjudicating OCSLA actions must use state
law of state whose coast is closest to occurrence of events giving rise to OCSLA claim).
Petitioner Gulf Offshore Oil Co. (Gulf) contracted with respondent Mobil Oil Corp. (Mobil)
for Gulf to undertake completion operations on oil drilling platforms located off the Louisiana
coast. Gulf, 453 U.S. at 475. Under the contract, Gulf agreed to indemnify Mobil for all claims
arising from the operations. Id. Subsequently, a Gulf employee engaged in operations under
the contract sustained injuries while attempting to evacuate co-workers from the platforms
during a storm. Id. at 475-76. The employee, a Texas resident, sued Mobil in Texas state district
court, alleging that negligence on the part of Mobil caused his injuries. Id. at 476. The Texas
court had personal jurisdiction over Mobil and Gulf because Mobil and Gulf did substantial
business in Texas. Id. at 477 n.2. Mobil then filed a third-party complaint against Gulf based
on the indemnification agreement. Id. Gulf in turn denied that the Texas court had jurisdiction
over the third party complaint. Id. at 476. Gulf argued that the Texas court lacked jurisdiction
over the third-party complaint because Mobil's cause of action arose under the OCSLA, a
federal statute over which Gulf alleged federal courts alone had exclusive jurisdiction. Id. The
Texas district court rejected Gulf's OCSLA exclusive jurisdiction argument. Id. Furthermore,
the Texas district court suggested that federal law pertaining to OCSLA was incomplete
concerning personal injury and indemnification actions and therefore applied Louisiana personal
injury and indemnification law because the injury took place off the Louisiana coast. Petitioner's
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explicit congressional intent to preclude concurrent state court jurisdiction
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at A-25 to 26, Gulf Offshore Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453
U.S. 473 (1981). Subsequently, the Texas district court approved a jury verdict finding that
Mobil's negligence resulted in the employee's injuries. Id. at A-24, A-26. The Texas district
court then held that Gulf had to indemnify Mobil for the personal injury damage award which
Mobil owed to the employee. Id. at A-26. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the Texas
district court's decision, and the Texas Supreme Court refused to review the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals' affirmation. Gulf, 453 U.S. at 476-77; see Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
594 S.W.2d 496, 502, 506 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming Texas district court's decision).
The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari in part to decide whether a state court
could adjudicate an OCSLA case based on incorporated state law. See Gulf, 453 U.S. at 477
(Court granted certiorari in part to determine whether Texas district court erred in refusing to
instruct jury that personal injury awards under OCSLA were not subject to federal income
taxation).
The United States Supreme Court held that state courts may exercise jurisdiction over
OCSLA claims based on incorporated state law. Id. at 484. The Gulf Court first reiterated the
traditional rule that state courts enjoy a presumptive right to adjudicate actions arising under
federal statutes. Id. at 477-78; see supra note 1 (discussing rationale behind traditional rule that
state courts enjoy presumptive right to adjudicate federal causes of action). The Court noted,
however, that Congress could restrict jurisdiction over a federal statute to federal courts either
expressly or implicitly. Gulf, 453 U.S. at 478. The Court then established a three-part test to
determine whether Congress, in enacting a statute, meant to rebut the presumption of a state
court's right to hear claims arising under the statute. Id. at 478. Under the three-part concurrent
jurisdiction test, a state court cannot adjudicate a claim arising under a federal statute if the
language of the statute explicitly directs exclusive federal court jurisdiction of the claim, if the
statute's legislative history implies unmistakably that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
of the claim, or if a clear incompatibility exists between the exercise of state court jurisdiction
and the furtherance of federal interests. Id.; see Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508
(1962) (only express statutory provision or existence of clear incompatibility between exercise
of state court jurisdiction and furtherance of federal interests bars state court from asserting
jurisdiction over federal statutory action).
Applying the three-part concurrent jurisdiction test, the Gulf Court found that the language
contained in OCSLA did not grant federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of OCSLA claims. See
Gulf, 453 U.S. at 478-79 (Congress granted United States district courts original jurisdiction of
cases arising under OCSLA, but grant of original jurisdiction to federal courts does not preclude
state court jurisdiction of OCSLA cases). The Gulf Court emphasized that 43 U.S.C. §
1333(a)(2), which directs the appropriate officers and courts of the United States to administer
and enforce all applicable state laws arising under OCSLA, did not mandate exclusive federal
court jurisdiction over OCSLA actions. Id. at n.6; see 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (1982) (appropriate
officers and courts of United States shall administer and enforce applicable state laws in OCSLA
actions). Instead, the Gulf Court stated that 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) required only that federal
courts adjudicating OCSLA actions could not ignore applicable state laws. Gulf, 453 U.S. at
n.6. The Guf Court then held that the legislative history of OCSLA did not rebut the
presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction over federal statutes and in particular over
OCSLA actions. See id. at 482 (opposition criticism suggesting federal courts had exclusive
jurisdiction of OCSLA cases not enough to rebut presumption of state court jurisdiction over
OCSLA cases when statutory language was silent on concurrent jurisdiction issue). Finally, the
Gulf Court noted that allowing a state court to adjudicate an OCSLA personal injury action
arising under state law did not endanger federal interests of uniformity of federal statutory
enforcement and the use of federal judicial expertise to resolve claims arising under federal
statutes. Id. at 484. The Gulf Court reasoned that no need existed to have uniform interpretation
of laws varying from state to state and that state judges possessed the sufficient expertise to
interpret and apply the laws of other states properly. Id.
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over the statute. 10 Courts analyzing the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue
have noted that only section 2000e-5(f)(3)" of Title 42 of the United States
Code addresses directly the issue of court jurisdiction of Title VII claims.
12
The courts addressing the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue generally
agree that section 2000e-5(f)(3) grants federal courts jurisdiction over Title
VII actions, but that nothing in the language of section 2000e-5(f)(3) excludes
the possibility that state courts might also have jurisdiction of Title VII
actions. 3
Since the language found in section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not resolve the
Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue, courts examine other sections of Title
VII to determine whether Congress intended explicitly to exclude state courts
10. 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982). Section 2000e-5(f)(3) of Title 42 of the United States
Code states in pertinent part only that federal district courts shall have jurisdiction over Title
VII actions. Id. Section 2000e-5(f)(3) does not state that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over Title VII actions. Id. Additionally, section 2000e-5(f)(3) provides that a complainant may
bring a Title VII action in any judicial district in the state in which the complainant alleges the
unlawful employment practice occurred, in the judicial district in which the alleged discriminator
files and administers employment records relevant to the practice, or in the judicial district in
which the aggrieved employee would have worked but for the alleged unlawful practice. Id.
Section 2000e-5(f)(3) states further that if the alleged discriminator is not found within one of
the above named districts, a complainant also may bring a Title VII action in the judicial
district in which the alleged discriminator's principal office is located. Id. The venue portion of
section 2000e-5(f)(3), however, does not state either that a Title VII complainant may bring a
Title VII action only in the above noted judicial districts or that the judicial districts noted
above are per se federal court judicial districts. Id.; see infra note 13 (citing cases in which
courts ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) did not foreclose possibility of state court jurisdiction
of Title VII actions).
12. See infra note 13 (citing cases in which courts ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)
did not foreclose possibility of state court jurisdiction of Title VII actions).
13. See, e.g., Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435 (9th Cir. 1984) (jurisdictional
statute 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) does not foreclose possibility that state courts have jurisdiction
of Title VII actions); Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43, 45 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (§
2000e-5(f)(3) alone does not require exclusive federal court jurisdiction of Title VII actions);
Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1279 (D.N.J. 1976) (§ 2000e-5(f)(3) contains
no express or implied language vesting federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII
actions); Salem v. LaSalle High School, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 10, 10 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (basing grant of removal of Title VII action from state court to federal court in part on
failure of § 2000e-5(f)(3) to mandate exclusive federal court jurisdiction of Title VII actions).
But see Fox v. Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 237, 358 N.E.2d 536, 537 (1976) (stating
without explanation that § 2000e-5(f)(3) precludes state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
Commentators that tangentially discuss the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue agree that
section 2000e-5(f)(3) alone does not preclude concurrent state court jurisdiction over Title VII
disputes. See Catania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies and Pendent Jurisdiction
Under Title V11. Access to Federal Courts, 32AM. U. L. REv. 777, 804 nn. 126 & 127 (1983)
(suggesting that federal courts may have exclusive jurisdiction over Title VII actions due to
statutory language found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5)); see also infra notes 76-80 and accom-




from adjudicating Title VII actions. 4 Courts deciding the Title VII concurrent
jurisdiction issue especially examine those sections of Title VII providing for
the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules for dispensation of
federal court cases, and federal rules governing jurisdiction of appeals for
evidence of congressional intent to limit adjudication of Title VII actions
exclusively to federal courts." For example, in Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc.,1
6
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined sections
2000e-5(f)(2)' 7 and 2000e-5(j) 8 of Title 42 of the United States Code in
determining whether state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII
14. See infra notes 11-86 and accompanying text (analyzing reasoning of courts that have
examined language of various sections of Title VII in attempt to determine whether Congress
intended explicitly to exclude state courts from hearing Title VII actions); cf. Gulf Offshore
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) (courts determining whether Congress, in
formulating a statute, intended to rebut traditional presumption of state court jurisdiction over
federal statutes, first must examine statutory language for explicit clues of such intent).
15. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(2) & 2000e-5(j) provide explicit congressional intent to deprive state
courts of jurisdiction over Title VII actions); Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43, 47
& n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(2), 2000e-5(f)(4), 2000e-5(f)(5) & 2000e-5(j)
refer to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or federal statutes applicable only in federal judicial
system).
16. 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1984).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1982). Section 2000e-5(f)(2) of Title 42 of the United States
Code provides in pertinent part:
... The Commission [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission], or the Attorney
General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivi-
sion, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending
final disposition of [a Title VII claim]. Any . . . order granting preliminary or
temporary relief shall be issued in accordance with rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Id. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 65. Rule 65 governs the issuance of injunctions and temporary
restraining orders in federal courts. Id. Under rule 65, no temporary restraining order (TRO)
can be issued without notice to either the adverse party or his attorney unless it appears from
affidavits or a verified complaint that irreparable injury will result to the applicant before the
adverse party can be given notice. Id. Furthermore, a federal court cannot grant a TRO unless
the applicant's attorney certifies in writing good faith efforts to give notice and the reasons for
which notice should not be required. Id. The initial duration of the TRO cannot exceed 10 days
from the date of issuance, but the federal court can extend this period either for good cause
shown or by consent of the party against whom the court issued the TRO. Id. Finally, a federal
court cannot issue a TRO or preliminary injunction without requiring the applicant to put forth
security to cover possible damages that the adverse party might sustain if a court later rules the
injunction or restraint to have been wrongful. Id. Determination of the amount of the security
is left to the discretion of the federal court judge. Id.; see also infra notes 57-72 and
accompanying text (discussing whether 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) mandates that all courts
addressing Title VII actions must apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 when fashioning
injunctive relief).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j) (1982). Section 2000e-5(j) suggests that any civil action
brought under Title VII is subject to appellate review as set forth in sections 1291 and 1292 of
Title 28 of the United States Code. Id. Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code
provides that federal courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction of all final federal district
court decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982). The purpose for allowing appellate review only of
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actions.' 9 Section 2000e-5(f)(2) refers to injunction rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 and section 2000e-5(j) refers to federal appellate
review sections 1291 and 1292 of Title 28 of the United States Code. 2' The
Valenzuela court concluded that Congress' insertion of rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in section 2000e-5(f)(2) and Congress' reference to
sections 1291 and 1292 of Title 28 of the United States Code found in section
2000e-5(j) of Title 42 of the United States Code revealed a congressional
intent to restrict adjudication of Title VII actions to federal courts. 22
The Valenzuela court based its conclusion on two rationales. 23 The
Valenzuela court first suggested that Congress might not have the constitu-
tional power to require state courts adjudicating federal claims to use federal
procedural and appellate rules when the state courts adjudicate federal causes
of action. 24 The Valenzuela court then reasoned that Congress did not enact
Title VII to test the constitutionality of congressional power to force state
courts to apply federal procedural and appellate rules when the state courts
heard federal statutory claims. 25 The Valenzuela court, therefore, concluded
that the language in Title VII containing federal procedural and appellate
rules revealed a congressional intent to exclude state courts from adjudicating
Title VII actions.
26
Similarly, in Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp.,27 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in addition to examining sections
2000e-5(f)(2) and 2000e-5(j), also examined sections 2000e-5(f)(4) 2s and 2000e-
5(0)(5)29 in determining whether state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over
final decisions is to prevent both delay and piecemeal litigation. United States v. Feeny, 641
F.2d 821, 824 (10th Cir. 1981). Section 1292 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
that federal courts of appeal generally have appellate jurisdiction of all interlocutory orders of
federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1982). An interlocutory order is an order determining
an intermediate issue made in the course of a pending litigation that does not dispose of the
case but instead abides resolution of the entire controversy. Taylor v. Breese, 163 F. 678, 684
(4th Cir. 1908).
19. 739 F.2d at 435-36.
20. See supra note 17 (noting language of section 2000e-5(f)(2) and of rule 65 of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
21. See supra note 18 (noting language of Section 2000e-5(j) and of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 &
1292).
22. 739 F.2d at 436.
23. See id. at 436 (offering two rationales for conclusion that Congress' use of federal
procedural and appellate rules in Title VII revealed a congressional intent to exclude state courts




27. 456 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4) (1982). Section 2000e-5(f)(4) provides that the chief judge
of the district court in which a Title VII action is pending must designate a district judge
immediately to hear the action. Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1982). Section 2000e-5(f)(5) permits a district court judge
designated under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4) to appoint a master pursuant to rule 53 of the
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Title VII actions.30 Section 2000e-5(f)(4) governs expeditious federal court
dispensation of Title VII cases, 31 and section 2000e-5(f)(5) refers to rule 53
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 The Dickinson court reasoned that
Congress did not possess the constitutional power either to force state courts
to use federal procedural or appellate rules when the state courts adjudicated
federal statutory claims or to force state courts to expedite adjudication of
federal statutory claims. 3 The Dickinson court, therefore, concluded that
the references to federal procedural rules, federal appellate review rules, and
expeditious dispensation of Title VII cases found in sections 2000e-5(f)(2),
2000e-5(f)(4), 2000e-5(f)(5) and 2000e-5(j) required a holding of exclusive
federal court jurisdiction of Title VII actions because federal procedural and
appellate rules were applicable only in federal courts.
34
The reasoning of the Valenzuela and Dickinson courts that Congress
does not or should not have the constitutional power to require courts
adjudicating federal causes of action to apply federal procedural and appel-
late review rules is based on two arguments. 35 The first argument is that each
state in the federal system is a sovereign and state courts should have the
constitutional right to formulate and apply their own procedural rules when
adjudicating claims in state court. 36 The second argument is that speed and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to help expedite adjudication of the Title VII action. Id. The
designated judge may appoint a master if the judge has not scheduled the Title VII case for
trial within 120 days after issue has been joined. Id. The term "master" includes a referee, an
auditor, an examiner, a commissioner, and an assessor. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. The judge may
limit the role of the master to that of a factfinder and/or a collector of evidence who will arrive
at findings of fact and suggest conclusions of law. Id. The master prepares a report of his
findings and conclusions and files the report with the court clerk. Id. In nonjury actions, the
judge may adopt, modify, or reject the report in whole or in part when rendering a decision.
Id. In jury actions, the report is admissible evidence subject only to evidentiary objections
applicable in trials in general. Id.
30. See 456 F. Supp. at 47 & note 7 (examining sections 2000e-5(0(2), 2000e-5(f)(4),
2000e-5(f)(5), & 2000e-5(j) in determining whether state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over
Title VII actions).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4) (1982); see supra note 28 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
5(0(4)).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(5) (applying rule 53 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 53 (discussing use of master in federal court system); supra note 29 (discussing
provisions of § 2000e-5(0(5) and of rule 53 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
33. 456 F. Supp. at 47 & note 7.
34. Id. at 47.
35. See infra notes 36-55 and accompanying text (discussing and rebutting arguments
suggeting that Congress should not have power to require state courts to apply federal procedural
and appellate rules when state courts adjudicate federal causes of action).
36. See Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551,
1556-57 (1960) (state court is branch of sovereign state and forcing that state court to enforce
the laws of another sovereign may infringe upon state's sovereignty) [hereinafter cited as State
Enforcement]. But see Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1,
57 (1912) (congressional legislation embodies policies created for all people of United States,
and state courts should treat congressional legislation as if the state legislature had enacted the
legislation).
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efficiency in the administration of justice will be impeded if state judges are
forced to learn an extra set of procedural rules.37 Article VI of the United
States Constitution, commonly referred to as the supremacy clause, counters
the argument that state courts possess an unassailable right to use their own
state procedural rules when adjudicating claims in state courts."8 The suprem-
acy clause of the Constitution provides that the Constitution, constitutional
federal legislation, and all authorized United States treaties are binding upon
state courts and legislatures notwithstanding contrary state laws. 9 Under the
supremacy clause, a state court must adjudicate a controversy in accordance
with applicable federal law.40 Furthermore, Supreme Court precedent suggests
that a state court should apply federal procedural and appellate rules if
applying state procedural rules effectively would nullify a right granted under
a federal law.4 ' For example, in Patterson v. Alabama4 2 the Supreme Court
vacated an Alabama decision that barred appeal of a murder conviction
because of failure of the accused to file a timely request for appeal in
accordance with state law. 43 The Supreme Court held that the state procedural
law requiring timely appeal effectively nullified the accused's federal law
right to challenge a conviction allegedly deriving from an unconstitutionally
biased jury selection."4 Patterson, therefore, potentially supports the propo-
sition that a state procedural rule effectively nullifying a federal right would
have to yield to federal procedural and appellate rules designed or inserted
in Title VII to protect Title VII rights. 45 Rights that the federal procedural
37. See State Enforcement, supra note 36, at 1557 (requiring state judge to adopt and
apply law of another judicial system puts onerous burden on that state judge to administer
justice effectively). But cf. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 484 (1981)
(state judge possesses sufficient competence to administer law arising from judicial system of
another state and is not per se unsympathetic to federal claims).
38. See U.S. CoNsT. art. VI (laws of United States take precedence over contrary state
laws).
39. Id.
40. See Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs., 253 U.S. 17, 20-24 (1920) (Oklahoma
Supreme Court decision overruled because Oklahoma Supreme Court adjudicated issue of taxing
Indians under local statute instead of applying contrary federal law); H. Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 507 (1954) (discussing whether state
courts can decline jurisdiction of suits brought under federal statutes).
41. See Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600, 605-07 (1935) (suggesting that state proce-
dural rule effectively nullifying federal law right might have to be subjugated to federal
procedural rule designed or inserted to protect the federal law right); see also infra notes 42-47
and accompanying text (suggesting that Patterson v. Alabama decision may imply right to force
state courts to apply federal procedural or appellate rules when state courts adjudicate federal
claims).
42. 294 U.S. 600 (1935).
43. Id. at 607.
44. See id. at 601, 605, 607 (county in which trial took place excluded negroes from jury
service).
45. See id. (Supreme Court vacated state court decision based on state appellate review
rule because state appellate review rule, while in general constitutional, in particular instance
effectively had nullified federal law right).
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rules inserted in Title VII protect may include preventing the federal govern-
ment from abusing the use of the injunctive remedy against alleged Title VII
employment discriminators46 and expediting adjudication of Title VII ac-
tions.
47
While the supremacy clause of the Constitution and Supreme Court
precedent undermine the argument that Congress does not have the power
to force state courts to use federal procedural and appellate rules when the
state courts adjudicate federal claims,48 the existence of highly competent
state court judges helps to counter the argument that speed and efficiency in
the administration of justice will be impeded if state judges are forced to
learn an extra set of procedural rules.4 9 State judges generally are just as
capable as federal judges in ascertaining and applying federal law efficiently. 50
Indeed, if state judges did not possess the competence, integrity and time to
ascertain and apply federal law properly, the Supreme Court probably would
have discarded the traditional presumption that state courts enjoy jurisdiction
over federal causes of action absent contrary congressional directive.5' More-
over, assuming that Title VII does require the use of federal procedural rules
for courts adjudicating Title VII actions, Title VII requires the use of only
a few such rules.5 2 Consequently, given the competency of state judges to
interpret federal law,5 3 the Supreme Court's willingness to vest a presumptive
right in state courts to adjudicate federal claims5 4 and the very limited
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1982) (requiring Attorney General or EEOC seeking
injunctive relief under Title VII against alleged employment discriminator first to satisfy
safeguards outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65); see also supra note 17 (discussing
safeguards in rule 65 that parties must satisfy before a federal court can grant injunctive relief).
47. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(O(4) and 2000e-5(f)(5) (1982) (providing for expeditious
adjudication of Title VII actions).
48. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (supremacy clause of Constitution and
Supreme Court precedent may undermine argument that Congress does not have power to force
state courts to use federal procedural and appellate rules when the state courts adjudicate federal
claims).
49. See Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q., 165, 166, 185 (1984) (state judges deserve praise for their high competence in
safeguarding federal rights); infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (suggesting that compe-
tency of state court judges helps to undermine argument that speed and efficiency in adminis-
tration of justice will be impeded if state judges are forced to learn an extra set of procedural
rules for Title VII actions).
50. Wright, supra note 49, at 165-66, 185.
51. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981) (state courts
are capable of vindicating federal rights and state court decisions concerning federal rights are
subject to safeguard of review by United States Supreme Court).
52. See supra notes 17-18 & 28-29 and accompanying text (noting the few sections of Title
VII that employ a very limited number of federal procedural and appellate rules).
53. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981) (state courts
are capable of vindicating federal rights).
54. See id. at 478 (state courts enjoy a presumptive right to adjudicate federal causes of
action); supra note I (discussing Supreme Court's rationale for holding that state courts continue
to enjoy a presumptive right to adjudicate federal causes of action).
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amount of federal procedural rules embodied in Title VII, asking state judges
to learn the few federal procedural rules of Title VII does not appear to
create an onerous impact upon the speed and efficiency of state judicial
systems and should not alone preclude state court adjudication of Title VII
actions. The supremacy clause of the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent,
and the competency of state judges to interpret federal law, therefore, suggest
that the Valenzuela and Dickinson courts erred in concluding that Congress
lacked the power to require state courts to use federal procedural and
appellate rules when the state courts adjudicate federal causes of action.5
An assumption that the Valenzuela and Dickinson courts correctly
forecast the lack of congressional power to require state courts adjudicating
federal claims to apply federal procedural and appellate rules, however, does
not lead necessarily to the conclusion of exclusive federal court jurisdiction
over Title VII actions. Indeed, a closer focus upon the language contained
in sections 2000e-5(f)(2), 2000e-5(f)(4), 2000e-5(f)(5) and 2000e-5j) reveals
that references contained therein to federal procedural and appellate rules
apply only in narrow circumstances and do not foreclose explicitly the
possibility of concurrent state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions.
6
For example, the Valenzuela court cited a portion of the language
contained in section 2000e-5(f)(2) requiring the use of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 for the proposition that rule 65 governed the issuance of all
injunctions granted in Title VII actions.57 The Valenzuela court then reasoned
that the reference to rule 65 found in section 2000e-5(f)(2) provided substan-
tial evidence of explicit congressional intent to limit Title VII actions to
federal courts because Congress did not want to infringe on a state court's
possible sovereign right to issue injunctions according to state law. 5 In fact,
section 2000e-5(f)(2) addresses only the right of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to seek injunctive relief in Title VII
actions. 9 Section 2000e-5(g) of Title VII allows courts adjudicating Title VII
actions discretion to enjoin parties from engaging in unlawful employment
55. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text (suggesting that existence of supremacy
clause of Constitution, Supreme Court precedent and the competency of state judges to interpret
federal law lead to conclusion that Congress should have constitutional power to require use of
federal procedural and appellate rules in state court adjudications of federal causes of action).
56. See infra notes 57-88 and accompanying text (suggesting that language of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-5(f)(2), 2000e-5(f)(4), 2000e-5(f)(5) & 2000e-5(j) does not foreclose explicitly the
possibility of concurrent state court jurisdiction of Title VII actions).
57. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 435-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) requires application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to all
considerations for injunctive relief contemplated in Title VII action); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
65 (governing issuance of injunctions in federal court); supra note 17 (discussing requirements
outlined in rule 65 prerequisite to obtaining and extending injunctive relief).
58. Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1984).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (requiring EEOC seeking injunctive relief under Title
VII action first to satisfy procedural prerequisites outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65 governing issuance of injunctions in federal court); see also supra note 17 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(2) in pertinent part).
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practices and does not mention rule 65. 60 A comparison of sections 2000e-
5(f)(2) and 2000e-5(g), therefore, suggests that Congress intended to limit
court sovereignty for issuing injunctions only to situations in which the
EEOC sought Title VII injunctive relief.6' Consequently, the Valenzuela
court's state sovereignty argument becomes less compelling because Congress
has the power to limit the enforcement capabilities of federal agencies.
62
The idea that the language of 2000e-5(f)(2) and 2000e-5(g) reveals a
congressional intent only to restrict the manner in which the EEOC may
seek Title VII injunctive relief finds support in the legislative history of Title
VII.63 Under the 1964 version of Title VII, the EEOC possessed only the
power to attempt conciliation between the alleged employment discriminator
and the aggrieved employee." After the 1964 version of Title VII was
adopted, however, many congressmen found that restricting the role of the
EEOC to mediator status resulted in inadequate enforcement of Title VII.0
These congressmen proposed that the EEOC receive the power to issue cease
and desist orders that would be enforceable in federal court and reviewable
in federal courts of appeal. 66 Other members of the House and the Senate,
however, believed that granting the EEOC cease and desist power was
tantamount to permitting the EEOC to make preliminary determinations of
guilt or innocence.67 Members of the House and Senate disfavoring the grant
of EEOC cease and desist power reasoned that the grant of such power
would force the alleged employment discriminator to prove his innocence
and therefore would result in a guilty until proven innocent standard rather
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) (permitting courts to use discretion to enjoin parties
from engaging in unlawful employment practices).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1982) (EEOC must satisfy prerequisites of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 65 before EEOC can obtain injunctive relief in Title VII action); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(J) (placing no Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 requirements on judges seeking to
enjoin parties in Title VII actions); see also Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274,
1279 n.2 (D.N.J. 1976) (legislative history of Title VII reveals concern over limiting EEOC
enforcement powers instead of concern over exclusivity of federal court jurisdiction); notes 60-
69 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history supporting idea that Congress intended
section 2000e-5(f)(2) to limit EEOC enforcement powers).
62. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (suggesting that
Congress has legislative power to create agencies and to regulate agency enforcement capabili-
ties).
63. See infra notes 64-72 and accompanying text (suggesting that legislative history of
Title VII reveals congressional intent to restrict ability of EEOC to obtain injunctive relief).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1965) (limiting role of EEOC to that of investigator and
conciliator).
65. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1, 9 (1971) (role of EEOC as
conciliator proved inadequate to insure effective enforcement of Title VII), reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2137, 2144.
66. Id. at 2145-46.
67. See H.R. REP. No. 238: MINORITY VIEWS oN H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 58, 58-
71 (1971) (granting cease and desist power to EEOC effectively will transform Title VII
enforcement into guilty until proven innocent scheme), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONo. &
AD. NEws 2167, 2167-76 [hereinafter cited as MINORITY VIEWS]. Cf. H. Conf. Rep. No. 899:
1985] 1419
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
than the traditional innocent until proven guilty principle. 6 Members of the
House and Senate opposing a grant of EEOC cease and desist power
concluded that determinations of guilt and innocence belonged to the courts. 69
When a bill to amend the 1964 version of Title VII emerged from the House
providing for EEOC cease and desist powers, the Senate therefore offered
an amendment authorizing the EEOC to seek injunctive relief in Title VII
actions.7 0 The House, probably under the partial influence of members
unhappy at the possibility of cease and desist orders, countered with the
proposal that no injunction in a Title VII action could issue unless substantial
and irreparable injury to the allegedly aggrieved party otherwise would be
unavoidable.7 ' The Senate then responded by offering an amendment per-
mitting the EEOC to obtain a court injunction under Title VII only if the
EEOC first satisfied the prerequisites of rule 65, which codifies common law
injunctive principles by emphasizing the injunction prerequisites of substan-
tial and irreparable injury.
72
An examination of the language contained in section 2000e-5(f)(4) also
reveals that Congress did not preclude the availability of concurrent jurisdic-
tion over Title VII actions. Section 2000e-5(f)(4) provides for expeditious
dispensation of Title VII actions.7 3 The language of 2000e-5(f)(4), however,
discusses only the duty of the chief judge of the federal district in which a
Title VII action is pending immediately to designate a district court judge to
hear the action.74 Nowhere in section 2000e-5(f)(4) or elsewhere in Title VII
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF MANAGERS AT THE CONFERENCE ON H.R. 1746 To FURTHER
PROMOTE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR AMERICAN WORKERS, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. I,
15-22 (1972) (noting senatorial amendment discarding right to EEOC cease and desist power
and instead permitting EEOC to seek injunctive relief through courts), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2179, 2179-86 [hereinafter cited as JOINT STATEMENT].
68. MINORITY VIEWS, supra note 67, at 58, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2167, 2167; cf. JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 17-18 (noting senatorial amendment
granting EEOC right to seek injunctive relief in court), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2179, 2182.
69. See MINORITY VIEWS, supra note 67, at 58-59 (noting only that EEOC should seek
enforcement of Title VII policy through federal court alone and that EEOC should not possess
cease and desist power), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2167, 2167-68; cf.
JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 18 (senatorial amendment permitting EEOC to seek
injunctive relief under Title VII in court), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2179, 2181.
70. JOINT STATEMENT, supra note 67, at 18, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2179, 2181.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 266-67 (5th Cir. 1972) (Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65 represents common law codification of procedural safeguards prerequisite
to obtaining injunctive relief); see also supra note 17 (outlining rule 65 safeguards prerequisite
to gaining injunctive relief).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4) (1982) (providing for expeditious dispensation of Title
VII actions that complainants have chosen to bring in federal court); see also supra note 28
(noting pertinent language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4).).
74. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(4) (1982).
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does Congress infringe upon the possible sovereign right of state courts
freely to arrange court calendars.7 5 Indeed, section 2000e-5(f)(5) requires a
judge adjudicating a Title VII action to assign the action for hearing only at
the earliest practicable date, leaving the definition of "practicable" to the
discretion of the judge.7 6 Moreover, section 2000e-5(f)(5) permits but does
not require a judge to appoint a master pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 53 for purposes of expediting adjudication of the Title VII claim.77
Consequently, the instructions contained in sections 2000e-5(f)(4) and 2000e-
5(f)(5) to expedite court cases and to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53 are permissive, not mandatory.7 Under the Gulf concurrent jurisdiction
test, explicit and not merely permissive statutory language is necessary to
rebut the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction over a federal
statute. 79 Application of sections 2000e-5(f)(4) and 2000e-5(f)(5) to the Gulf
test then should not preclude concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions. s0
While sections 2000e-5(f)(4) and 2000e-5(f)(5) do not contain an explicit
mandate of exclusive federal court jurisdiction of Title VII actions, section
2000e-5(j) provides the strongest statutory argument for denying concurrent
state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions."' Section 2000e-5() contains
language to the effect that any Title VII action brought in court is subject
to appellate review as outlined in sections 1291 and 1292 of Title 28 of the
United States Code. 2 Congress may not have the constitutional power to
force state courts adjudicating federal causes of action to use federal appellate
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e3-17 (1982) (containing no language infringing directly
upon right of state courts to arrange state court calendars).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1982) (requiring judges to arrange hearings for Title VII
actions at earliest "practicable" date, but never defining meaning of "practicable").
77. See id. (permitting but not requiring court adjudicating Title VII action to appoint a
master pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 to help expedite action if court has not
scheduled case for trial within one hundred and twenty days after issue has been joined).
78. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (suggesting permissive rather than
mandatory nature of langaage contained in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(4) and 2000e-5(f)(5)
concerning Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue).
79. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (statutory
language must be explicit to preclude concurrent state court jurisdiction over a federal cause of
action); see also supra note 9 (noting facts, holding, and reasoning of Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Afobil Oil Corp.).
80. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (statutory
language must be explicit to preclude state court adjudication of Title VII actions); supra notes
73-77 (suggesting that 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(4) & 2000e-5(f)(5) do not contain language
revealing explicit congressional intent to preclude state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j) (1982) (containing language that may direct all courts
adjudicating Title VII actions to use 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 1292 for appellate review); see also
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1982) (rules for United States Court of Appeals review of United
States District Court decisions); supra note 18 (discussing provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
1292).
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(j) (civil actions brought under Title VII subject to appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 1292).
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procedure. 3 If Congress did not possess such constitutional power, Congress
would not have intended the language contained in section 2000e-5(j) to
require state courts to follow sections 1291 and 1292 of Title 28 of the United
States Code concerning appellate review of state court Title VII determina-
tions.84 The lack of congressional intent to require state courts to follow
sections 1291 and 1292 concerning appellate review of Title VII actions,
however, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that jurisdiction over
Title VII actions rests exclusively in federal courts. Instead, application of
the two traditional statutory rules that courts should interpret civil rights
statutes broadly to increase the remedial effect of such statutes, 5 and that
courts should interpret a statute as a whole to avoid apparent inconsistencies,
suggests that the language of section 2000e-5(j) applies only when a plaintiff
chooses to bring a Title VII action in federal court and does not explicitly
preclude the plaintiff from bringing Title VII claims in state court.8 6
The preceding discussion of the statutory language of Title VII suggests
that such language does not explicitly prohibit the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction over Title VII actions.17 Under the Gulf concurrent jurisdiction
83. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that Congress has
constitutional power to force state courts- adjudicating federal causes of action to use federal
procedural and appellate review rules to protect rights existent under federal law). But see
Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1984) (questioning whether Congress has
constitutional power to force state courts adjudicating federal causes of action to use federal
appellate review rules).
84. See Valenzuela v. Kraft, Inc., 739 F.2d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating doubtfulness
of possibility that Congress intended to infringe upon state sovereignty by forcing state court
adjudicating federal cause of action to use federal appellate review rules).
85. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 308-17 (1964) (suggesting that Civil
Rights Act of 1964 should receive broad interpretation to effectuate remedies), reh'g denied,
379 U.S. 995 (1964); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 702 (3d Cir. 1949) (suggesting that civil
rights legislation requires broad interpretive reading in order to effectuate purpose of such
legislation); Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353, 1359-60 (E.D. La. 1975) (suggesting that
courts should construe civil rights statutes as broadly as necessary to remedy evils for which
legislature enacted such statutes). Congress enacted Title VII to reduce employment discrimi-
nation and to provide remedies for victims of employment discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) (employer acts unlawfully when employer discharges or discriminates against
any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (objective of Title VII is to achieve equality of
employment opportunities). Interpreting section 2000e-5(j) to prohibit the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction over Title VII actions would emasculate the remedial effect and frustrate the purpose
of Title VII actions because of the impact of the doctrines of res judicata and pendent
jurisdiction on the adjudication of Title VII actions. See infra notes 118-66 and accompanying
text (suggesting that current application of res judicata and pendent jurisdiction doctrines in
Title VII actions serverely curtails availability of federal courts as forums for resolution of
discriminatory employment claims and mandates the need for concurrent jurisdiction over Title
VII actions to vindicate the rights of Title VII claimants).
86. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962) (court should not read section
of statute in isolation from context of entire statute); 2A J. SUTHERLAND & C. SANDS, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05, at 56 (4th ed. 1973) (statute should be read as a whole
to avoid both apparent inconsistencies and frustration of purpose behind statute).
87. See supra notes 11-86 and accompanying text (discussing whether statutory language
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test, only explicit and not permissive statutory language can rebut the
presumption of state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions.88 Under the
Gulf test, however, the absence of explicit statutory language denying state
court jurisdiction over a federal statutory cause of action does not preclude
the possibility of exclusive federal court jurisdiction of the action. 9 A federal
court still might have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under a
particular federal statute if the legislative history surrounding passage of the
federal statute unmistakably implies exclusive federal court jurisdiction or if
a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests
is embodied in the statute.9
A review of the legislative history and statutory language of Title VII
reveals that the majority of present day Title VII is much the same as the
original Title VII that Congress passed in 1964.9' Indeed, the most recent
amendments to Title VII undertaken in 1972 only expand coverage of Title
VII and permit the EEOC to bring suits to address alleged discriminatory
employment practices.9 2 Interpreting the legislative history of the 1964 version
of Title VII, however, is a precarious venture because no legislative reports
of Title VII explicitly precludes the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
88. See Gulf Offshore Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (statutory
language must be explicit to rebut presumption of state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
89. See id. (only explicit statutory language, unmistakable implication from legislative
history, or clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal policy interests will
bar state court jurisdiction of an action arising under a federal statute).
90. Id.
91. See Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 845-89 (1972) (analyzing amendments to 1964 version of
Title VII wrought in Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972). Prior to the 1972 amendment
to Title VII, the EEOC possessed only the power to attempt conciliation between the alleged
employment discriminator and the aggrieved complainant. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1965). Many
congressmen believed that the inability of the EEOC to have any real enforcement capabilities
contributed to ineffective enforcement of Title VII in general. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1, 9 (1971) (limiting role of EEOC to conciliator proved inadequate to insure
effective enforcement of Title VII), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137,
2137, 2144. Congressional belief in the ineffectiveness of the EEOC as conciliator led to the
provision in the 1972 amendment allowing for the EEOC to seek injunctive relief in court and
to undertake court suits on behalf of aggrieved complainants. See The Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
to 2000e-15 and embodied in present 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17). In addition, Congress
amended Title VII in 1972 to include coverage of educational institutions, employers of 15 or
more employees instead of the previous limit of 25 employees, and governments, governmental
agencies or political subdivisions. Id.; see generally Sape & Hart, supra, at 845-89 (analyzing
1972 amendments to Title VII). The 1972 amendments to Title VII, however, afford little insight
on the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text
(analyzing legislative history of 1972 amendments of Title VII for information of congressional
intent concerning Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue).
92. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972)
(amending 1964 version of Title VII); see also supra note 91 (brief discussion of 1972 amendments
to 1964 version of Title VII).
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accompanied the enactment in 1964 of Title VII. 93 Despite the nonexistence
of legislative reports, however, other sources are available for analysis.9 4
These sources include an unenacted House version of Title VII, enacted
Senate revisions of the unenacted House version of Title VII, and legislators'
explanatory statements concerning passage of the 1964 version of Title VII
in general. 9
5
Some congressmen who helped to construct the unenacted version of
Title VII suggested that Title VII should apply only when state enforcement
of state fair employment practice statutes did not adequately protect against
employment discrimination.96 Emphasis on the adequacy of state laws pro-
tecting against employment discrimination reveals that some congressmen
believed in the effectiveness of state fair employment laws, while other
congressmen questioned the effectiveness of those state laws.97 The division
of the legislators on the effectiveness of state antidiscriminatory employment
laws resulted in inclusion within the unenacted 1964 House version of Title
VII a provision stating that the EEOC could defer to state and local agencies
to resolve alleged discriminatory practices rather than sue employment dis-
criminators under Title VII. 9s While such a state and federal partnership to
combat employment discrimination existed in the House version of Title VII,
several congressmen wanted more state involvement in the prevention of
employment discrimination.99 The desire of some congressmen to afford the
states a greater role in combatting employment discrimination probably led
93. See Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper role of Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in Title V11 Suits, 79 MIcH. L. REV. 1485, 1492-93 (1981). The nonexistence of any
legislative reports accompanying the ultimate passage of the 1964 version of Title VII makes
interpretation of the legislative history of Title VII difficult. Id. The existence of other available
sources, however, renders interpretation of the legislative history of the 1964 version of Title
VII possible. See infra notes 95-116 and accompanying text (discussing relation of Title VII
legislative history to Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue).
94. See, e.g., H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, -(1964) (unenacted version of Title
VII), reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 2001-2153 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; 110 CONG. REc. 11,926, 11,930-34 (1964) (Senate revisions of H.R. 7152
eventually enacted into Title VII of 1964); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3003-08, 3017-21 (discussing
Senate revisions of H.R. 7152); infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing various
remarks of congressmen on Title VII).
95. See supra note 94 (citing legislative history sources for 1964 version of Title VII).
96. See 110 CONG. REc. 2728 (1964) (statement of Rep. McClory) (EEOC should not take
jurisdiction over Title VII claim arising in particular state unless President of United States first
determined that state's enforcement of antidiscriminatory employment laws did not effectively
accomplish objectives of Title VII); 110 CONG. REC. 2727 (1964) (statement of Rep. Cramer)
(states should have exclusive jurisdiction to prevent employment discrimination unless EEOC
determines that state enforcement of antidiscriminatory employment law does not adequately
meet objectives of Title VII).
97. See Jackson, supra note 93, at 1493-94 (discussing legislative history of Title VII).
98. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. § 708(b) (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 94, at 2009, 2013.
99. See 110 CONG. REc. 10,520 (1964) (statement of Sen. Carlson) (expecting state officials
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ultimately to the enacted Senate revisions of Title VII. The Senate revisions,
embodied in the 1964 Title VII act, provided the EEOC only with powers to
attempt conciliation between the aggrieved party and the alleged employment
discriminator.'10 The 1964 version of Title VII therefore partially symbolizes
Congress' acknowledgement that states could combat employment discrimi-
nation and suggests that 1964 Title VII legislators might have been open to
the idea of concurrent state court jurisdiction of Title VII actions. 0 1
The scattered and diverse comments of various legislators concerning the
entire legislative process behind the eventual passage of the 1964 version of
Title VII suggest neither absolute disfavor nor support of state court juris-
diction over Title VII actions.0 2 For example, one senator noted that the
enacted 1964 version of Title VII permitted a plaintiff to commence a Title
VII action in federal court if state authorities failed to examine the plaintiff's
alleged employment discrimination claim within a reasonable time. 0 3 The
senator's remarks, in effect, did not deny the plaintiff the opportunity to
pursue a Title VII action in state court, but stated only that the plaintiff
could bring a Title VII action in federal court."' 4 In addition, two other
senators debating passage of the 1964 Title VII legislation suggested that the
EEOC ordinarily might bring a suit in federal district court to enforce Title
VII and that, if the EEOC decided not to sue, the aggrieved individual could
file a private Title VII action in federal court. 05° As previously noted,
Congress possesses the power to limit the enforcement capabilities of federal
agencies, and perhaps some congressmen intended to limit EEOC enforce-
ment of Title VII to federal court.'06 The remarks of the three senators,
however, did not mandate denial of state court jurisdiction of Title VII
to handle majority of enforcement of antidiscriminatory employment laws); 110 CONG. REc.
6449 (1964) (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (suggesting that federal and state courts should work
together to prevent discrimination in employment).
100. 110 CONG. REc. 11,926, 11,930-34 (1964) (Senate revisions ultimately enacted in 1964
version of Title VII put less emphasis on EEOC involvement in Title VII disputes); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (1965) (EEOC only has power to attempt conciliation of aggrieved claimant and
alleged employment discriminator).
101. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text (suggesting that several legislators put
emphasis on federal and state partnership to enforce Title VII).
102. See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text (suggesting that comments of various
congressmen on topic of Title VII reveals only uncertainty as to whether Congress intended to
exclude state courts from adjudicating Title VII actions).
103. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,708 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (individual should
be able to bring Title VII actions in federal court if state with antidiscriminatory employment
laws fails to act on individual's alleged employment discrimination claim within a reasonable
time).
104. Id.
105. See 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (statements of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case) (EEOC
ordinarily would sue under Title VII in federal court and a decision of EEOC not to sue would
leave aggrieved individual with option to pursue Title VII relief in federal court).
106. Cf. MINORITY REPORT UPON PROPOSED CIVIL RIGHTS ACT of 1963, CONIMITTEE ON
JUDICIARY SUBSTITUTE FOR H.R. 7152 (1964) (suggesting that some legislators feared affording
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actions, but merely permitted private Title VII actions in federal court. 10 7
Moreover, other legislators' remarks emphasizing a state and federal part-
nership to combat employment discrimination refer only to the use of courts
and not solely to the use of federal courts for adjudication of Title VII
claims. 05
The legislative history behind the 1972 amendments to Title VII reveals
uncertainty similar to that accompanying the 1964 version of Title VII
concerning the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue.1' 9 The 1972 amend-
ments to Title VII gave the EEOC the right to seek injunctive relief and to
sue on the behalf of employment discrimination victims in court. 10 Moreover,
legislators' remarks concerning the enforcement capabilities of the EEOC
suggest that Congress expected the EEOC to bring Title VII actions in federal
court."' Again, however, statements of other legislators concerning court
enforcement of Title VII actions did not restrict Title VII complainants
EEOC and government too much enforcement power would lead to excessive interference with
both management prerogatives and union freedoms), printed in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2431, 2434, 2440-41, 2455; ADDITIONAL VIEWS ON H.R. 7152 of HON. WILLIAM T.
CAHILL, HON. GARNER E. SHRIVER, HON. CLARK MACGREGOR, HON. CHARLES McC. MATHIAS,
HON. JAMES E. BROMWELL (1964) (deleting provision that provided EEOC with cease-and-desist
power and instead providing federal judiciary with ultimate power to resolve discriminatory
employment claims was part of compromise resulting in Civil Rights Act of 1964), printed in
1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2487, 2515-16; supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text
(suggesting both that Congress has legislative power to regulate enforcement capabilities of
federal agency and that Congress intended to limit enforcement capabilities of EEOC).
107. See 110 CONG. REC. 12,708 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (containing no
language that required individual suing under Title VII to pursue such suit only in federal court
as opposed to state court); 110 CONO. REC. 7213 (1964) (statements of Sen. Clark and Sen.
Case) (noting that EEOC, given enforcement powers, ordinarily would sue under Title VII in
federal court, but not stating specifically that aggrieved individual could bring a Title VII action
only in federal court).
108. See 110 CONG. REC. 6417-19 (1964) (statement of Sen. Morse) (courts in general will
have difficulty understanding and applying Title VII unless Congress improves upon ambiguous
language found in Title VII); 110 CONG. REC. 5813, 5818 (1964) (statement of Sen. Stennis)
(refering only to use of courts and not solely to use of federal courts as forums for adjudication
of Title VII actions); ef. Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1279-80 (D.N.J.
1976) (suggesting that Attorney General and EEOC can bring Title VII claims only in federal
court but that individual complainant is free to bring Title VII action either in state court or in
federal court); 110 CONG. REC. 5817 (1964) (statement of Sen. Nelson) (Title V11 embodies
concurrent jurisdiction between federal law and state law).
109. See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (suggesting that 1972 amendments to
Title VII reveal uncertainty concerning whether Congress intended to restrict jurisdiction of
Title VII actions exclusively to federal court).
110. See Equal Employment & Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15) (amendment of 1964 version of Title VII
allowing EEOC to bring Title VII suits in court).
111. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1, 9 (1971) (EEOC should enjoy
power to issue cease and desist orders that would be enforceable in federal court), reprinted in
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2137, 2144; MINORITY VIEWS, supra note 67, at 58-
59 (EEOC should seek enforcement of Title VII only through conciliation or by bringing Title
VII suits in federal courts), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2167, 2168.
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solely to federal courts for adjudication of Title VII actions." 2 Under the
Gulf concurrent jurisdiction test, legislative history surrounding a federal
statute rebuts the traditional presumption of state court jurisdiction over the
statute only if the legislative history implies unmistakably that Congress
intended to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over actions arising under the
statute.' '
Since no explicit Title VII language exists denying concurrent state court
jurisdiction of Title VII actions, and since the legislative history of Title VII
does not supply an unmistakable implication of congressional intent to limit
adjudication of Title VII actions to federal courts, application of the Gulf
test permits a conclusion of exclusive federal court jurisdiction of Title VII
actions only if clear incompatibility exists between the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction and the furtherance of federal interests associated with Title
VII. 4 The major federal policy interest associated with enforcement of Title
VII is the effective reduction of employment discrimination.' '5 Other federal
policy interests associated with enforcement of Title VII include furtherance
of uniformity in creation and application of federal common law concerning
Title VII, the advantage of relying on federal judicial expertise for resolution
of Title VII actions, avoidance of multiplicious suits, and increase judicial
efficiency."
6
An overview of the major case law concerning the jurisdictional aspect
of Title VII suggests that no clear incompatibility exists between permitting
state court jurisdiction over Title VII and furthering federal interests embod-
112. See MINORrry ViEws, supra note 67, at 69 (statement of Rep. Mazzoli) (stating only
a preference for court enforcement of Title VII actions instead of granting EEOC cease and
desist powers), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2167, 2177; 118 CONG. REc.
308 (1972) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (suggesting only that EEOC or complainant under Title
VII probably would sue a state or a political subdivision of the state in federal court for alleged
state or state subdivision employment discrimination).
113. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
114. Id.; see supra notes 11-86 and accompanying text (suggesting that no statutory language
in Title VII explicitly precludes concurrent state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions); supra
notes 91-112 and accompanying text (suggesting that legislative history of Title VII does not
supply unmistakable implication of congressional intent to preclude concurrent state court
jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982) (stating that an employer acts unlawfully when
an employer discharges or discriminates against any individual on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971) (objective
of Title VII is to achieve equality of employment opportunities).
116. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981) (maintaining
uniformity of law and relying upon expertise of federal judges to interpret and apply federal
law represent two policy reasons against granting concurrent state court jurisdiction over federal
causes of action); 118 CONG. REc. 3370 (1972) (statement of Sen. Javits) (discussing whether
principle of res judicata would bar relitigation in federal court of employment discrimination
issues previously litigated in state court); 118 CONG. REc. 3172-73, 3368 (statement of Sen.
Hruska) (expressing concern over expense and delay involved in litigating same discrimination
claims in both state and federal proceedings).
1985] 1427
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
ied in the enforcement of Title VII.17 The Supreme Court decision of Kremer
v. Chemical Construction Corp."8 highlights one possible role of state courts
in resolving Title VII claims. In Kremer, the United States Supreme Court
determined whether a state court decision upholding a state agency dismissal
of a state employment discrimination claim barred the complainant from
bringing a Title VII action in federal court. 119 Although the state court only
reviewed a state agency dismissal of an alleged violation of state fair
employment laws, the Supreme Court, applying the principle of res judicata,
held that a procedurally adequate state court decision on those state laws
precluded a complainant from bringing a Title VII suit based on the same
alleged discriminatory employment conduct in federal court. 120 The Kremer
holding, therefore, allows a state court tangentially to judge the merits of a
117. See infra notes 118-71 and accompanying text (suggesting that Title VII cases reveal
no clear incompatibility between permitting state court jurisdiction over Title VII and furthering
federal interests embodied in Title VII).
118. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
119. Id. at 466-67.
120. Id. at 485. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., the United States Supreme
Court held that a procedurally adequate state court affirmation of a state antidiscriminatory
employment agency finding of no reasonable cause on a state employment discrimination claim
against the plaintiff barred the plaintiff from bringing a Title VII suit based on the same alleged
discriminatory employment conduct in federal court). Id. The Kremer Court relied on section
1738 of Title 28 of the United States Code in holding that the state court affirmation of the
state agency finding barred the plaintiff from pursuing a Title VII action in federal court. Id.
at 466-67, 485; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (full faith and credit statute). The full faith and
credit statute requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to a valid state court
judgment that the judgment would receive from the courts of the state in which the judgment
arose. Id. The Kremer Court noted that the state court judgment was procedurally valid because
the plaintiff had an attorney present throughout the state agency and state court proceedings
and had the opportunity to present evidence and witnesses, to testify, and to rebut evidence
presented against the plaintiff. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 483-85. Furthermore, the Kremer Court
stated that the issues giving rise to the state discriminatory employment claim were similar to
the issues that would arise under the purported Title VII claim and that the state law was
similar to the Title VII law in that both laws provided that an unlawful discriminatory
employment practice occurred when an employer refused to hire, discharged, or otherwise
discriminated against an employee due to race, religion, or national origin. Id. at 479 & n.20;
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (unlawful employment practice occurs when employer refuses
to hire, discharges or otherwise discriminates against an individual on basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1) (McKinney 1982) (unlawful
employment discrimination practice occurs when an employer fails to hire, discharges or
otherwise discriminates against an employer or potential employee on basis of national origin,
sex, race, disability or marital status). Under the principle of res judicata, a plaintiff cannot
relitigate issues or claims that the plaintiff litigated or should have litigated in a prior action.
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). The Kremer Court further noted that section 1738
of Title 28 of the United States Code required federal courts to apply res judicata to prior state
court actions. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466 & n.6. The Kremer Court then applied section 1738 to
hold that the plaintiff could not bring a Title VII action in federal court that would be based




Title VII claim and thereby signals confidence in the ability of state courts
to prevent employment discrimination.1
2
1
The relation between the Kremer decision and the federal interest in
effectively reducing discriminatory employment practices is especially impor-
tant to resolution of the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction issue. One initial
reason for the development of Title VII was that many interest groups and
legislators did not believe that state laws adequately addressed the problem
of employment discrimination. 2 2 Indeed, these interest groups and legislators
demonstrated a special concern for the failure of southern states to prevent
employment discrimination. 3 The Kremer decision effectively held that the
concern of interest groups and legislators for the capacity of states to prevent
employment discrimination does not supplant the constitutional requirement
that a valid state court judgment enjoy the same full faith and credit in
subsequent federal court actions as the judgment would receive in other state
courts of the state in which the state court rendered the judgment.
2 4
Consequently, the Kremer decision implies increased confidence in the ability
of state courts to prevent employment discrimination. 25 Since the Kremer
decision allows a state court tangentially to judge the merits of a Title VII
claim, the next logical step would be to acknowledge state court jurisdiction
over Title VII actions.
In addition to placing confidence in the capabilities of state courts to
prevent employment discrimination, the Kremer decision emphasizes the
federal interest in avoidance of multiplicious suits and furtherance of judicial
efficiency, two interests embodied in the doctrine of res judicata.' 26 A major
concern of Congress during the 1972 amendments to Title VII was reduction
of overcrowded federal dockets.'27 Allowing a state court tangentially to
decide Title VII claims prevents second employment discrimination suits in
federal court and thereby reduces the already overburdened federal court
121. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466 n.6 (final judgment on merits of an action bars relitigation
of claim raised or claim that should have been raised in prior action).
122. See Vaas, Title VI. Legislative History, B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 431, 431-33
(1966) (discussing pressure that various civil rights organizations put on federal government to
address problems of discrimination); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (noting reluctance
of legislators to place faith in adequacy of state antidiscriminatory employment laws).
123. See 110 CONG. REc. 7025 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark) (noting that not a single
state of old confederacy had yet to enact comprehensive state antidiscriminatory employment
laws).
124. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466, 485 & n.6 (adverse state court judgment on state
antidiscriminatory employment law claim against plaintiff barred same plaintiff from bringing
Title VII claim in federal court based on same alleged discriminatory conduct).
125. See id. at 479, 483-85 (New York state law, state agency and state court proceedings
provided plaintiff with fair opportunity to air employment discrimination claim).
126. See Kremer, 456 U.S. at n.6 (federal courts apply doctrine of res judicata to prevent
repetitious suits and to encourage judicial efficiency).
127. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 10-11 (1971) (overcrowded federal
court dockets prevent effective enforcement of Title VII), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 2137, 2146.
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dockets.' 28 By extension, granting state courts concurrent jurisdiction over
Title VII actions probably would result in reduction of federal dockets and
would allow attorneys and courts to focus their resources and to bring forth
all the relevant evidence concerning the alleged discriminatory employment
conduct at one trial. 29 Allowing state courts concurrent jurisdiction over
Title VII actions and addressing the problem of employment discrimination
at one state trial then may increase judicial efficiency, and may reduce the
cost of attorney's fees because the client may pursue or defend against
employment discrimination claims in one instead of two judicial systems. 30
The question of whether to allow a party litigating a Title VII claim to
sue or be sued on the Title VII claim in state court takes on importance
when considered in light of Title VII pendent jurisdiction case law. Under
pendent jurisdiction, a federal court adjudicating a claim arising under
federal law sometimes may adjudicate a claim between the same parties that
is based on state law despite the nonexistence of diversity between the
parties.'3' The federal court's right to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the
state claim despite the nonexistence of diversity jurisdiction depends in part
on whether the federal and state claims are so closely related as to arise from
a common nucleus of operative fact ordinarily leading the plaintiff to expect
to try both claims in one judicial proceeding.3 2 Federal courts have held that
existence of a loose factual connection between the state and federal claims
is enough to satisfy the common nucleus requirement. 33 For example, if the
128. See Redish & Muench, supra note 1, at 312 (granting of concurrent jurisdiction eases
federal court burden of overcrowded dockets).
129. Id.; cf. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466 n.6 (general federal interests include effort to avoid
multiple suits and conserve judicial resources).
130. Cf., Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274, 1280 (D.N.J. 1976) (suggesting
wisdom of proceeding with state and federal employment discrimination claims in one court).
131. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1966) (federal court
addressing federal claim under certain circumstances also may address state claim despite lack
of diversity jurisdiction between parties to state claim). A federal court addressing a federal
claim may address a state claim despite a lack of diversity jurisdiction between the parties to
the state claim when the federal and state claims are so closely related as to arise from a
common nucleus of operative fact ordinarily leading the plaintiff to expect to try both claims
in one judicial proceeding. Id. at 725. The diversity jurisdiction doctrine, which derives from
article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, provides that federal courts possess the
judicial power to adjudicate cases between citizens of different states based on state law. U.S.
CoNsT. art. III, § 2. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at §§ 23-37 (discussing merits and
intricacies of diversity jurisdiction).
132. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
133. See, e.g., Tower v. Moss, 625 F.2d 1161, 1163 (5th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that factual
connection existing between state consumer claims and federal consumer claims would permit
exercise of pendent jurisdiction); Frye v. Pioneer Logging Mach., Inc., 555 F. Supp. 730, 732
(D.S.C. 1983) (existence of loose factual connection between state claim and federal claim
permits federal court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claim); Mid-State Food Dealers
Ass'n v. City of Durand, 525 F. Supp. 387, 392 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (loose factual connection
existing between state constitutional claims and claims arising under United States Constitution
sufficient to allow federal court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims).
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state and federal cause of action arise out of the same transaction or several
of the same facts proffered in court would go toward the merits of both the
state claim and the federal claim, then the common nucleus test is satisfied.
34
Even if a common nucleus of facts between the state claim and the federal
claim exists, however, the federal courts, in the interest of justice, will not
exercise jurisdiction over state law claims if the state court has not yet
authoritatively resolved the status of the state law, if state issues or remedies
substantially predominate, or if jury confusion would result . 35
Federal courts adjudicating Title VII claims experience little trouble in
finding the existence of a common nucleus of operative facts between the
Title VII claim and state claims arising from the same alleged employment
discrimination conduct. 36 Several federal courts finding an existence of a
common nucleus of operative facts between the state claim and the Title VII
claim, however, refuse to grant pendent jurisdiction over state antidiscrimi-
nation employment claims because of the unresolved status of state law or
the substantial predominance of state issues or state remedies over Title VII
issues or remedies.1 3 7 For example, in Wilkins v. Baldwin Piano & Organ
134. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 231 (9th Cir. 1975) (state corporate
fiduciary duty claim and federal claim based on fiduciary duty standards imposed under
Securities Exchange Act arise from same action of alleged management misconduct and therefore
permits federal court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claim); Vanderboom v. Sexton,
422 F.2d 1233, 1242-43 (8th Cir. 1970) (state common law fraud claim and claims for violations
of federal securities laws arise from same series of transactions and therefore federal court may
exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claim); Marceno v. Northwestern Chrysler-Plymouth
Sales, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 595, 601 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (since state common law fraud, false
imprisonment and conversion claims and federal claims under Truth in Lending Act all arose
from same attempt to buy and finance car, federal court could exercise pendent jurisdiction
over state claims).
135. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966) (federal courts
determining whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction should avoid needless decisions of state
law and should not exercise pendent jurisdiction over state claim either if state issues substantially
predominate action or if jury confusion would justify separating claims for federal and state
trials); Merritt v. Colonial Foods, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 910, 915 (D. Del 1980) (pendent jurisdiction
denied because state issues predominated substantially over federal issues); Mazzare v. Burroughs
Corp., 473 F. Supp. 234, 241 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over
state claim because of unsettled state law and probability of jury confusion); Fowler v.
Department of Educ., 472 F. Supp. 121, 123 (E.D. Va. 1978) (pendent jurisdiction over state
claim denied because state supreme court had not yet interpreted applicable state statute).
136. See Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst. of Metropolitan Detroit, Inc., 510 F. Supp.
722, 724-25 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (existence of common nucleus of operative facts between Title
VII claim and state employment discrimination law claim satisfied common nucleus portion of
pendent jurisdiction test); Palazon v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 458, 459 (N.D. IlI. 1981) (Title VII claim and state discrimination claim arose out of
common nucleus of operative fact and therefore permitted federal court to adjudicate state
claim); cf. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 473-74 (1982) (Title VII claim and
state discriminatory employment claim constituted a single claim).
137. See, e.g., Jong-Yul Lim v. International Inst. of Metropolitan Detroit, Inc., 510 F.
Supp. 722, 724-25 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (denying pendent jurisdiction over state discriminatory
employment law claim because state claim permitted compensatory and punitive damages
1985] 1431
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
Co.,' 35 the United States District Court for the District of Kansas refused to
grant pendent jurisdiction over a state employment discrimination law claim
because the Kansas state courts had not yet resolved the scope of remedies
available under the Kansas Civil Rights' Act for discriminatory employment
conduct. 39 Additionally, in Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp.,"40 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California refused to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress applied in state courts to prevent intentional employment
discrimination because the state claim permitted the remedy of punitive
damages not available under Title VII.14' The Van Hoomissen court reasoned
that the punitive damage issue would predominate over the Title VII claim
and that the state claim, therefore, should be relegated to the state courts
for adjudication. 42 Similarly, in Kiss v. Tamarac Utilities, Inc., 43 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, while adjudicating
a Title VII claim, refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state
employment discrimination law claim because the state claim allowed for
compensatory damages not recoverable under Title VII.1
44
One effect of the federal court's refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over state antidiscrimination employment laws when adjudicating Title VII
actions is that the plaintiff then might have to litigate either simultaneously
or successively in both federal and state courts to redress the same essential
wrong of employment discrimination. 41 If the plaintiff first brings his Title
VII action in federal court, the pendent jurisdiction doctrine may require
him either to bring a separate action in state court to resolve his state
unavailable under Title VII); Kiss v. Tamarac Utilities, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 951, 954 (S.D. Fla.
1978) (pendent jurisdiction in Title VII action denied as to state discriminatory employment
claim because state claim provided for compensatory damages unavailable under Title VII);
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (pendent jurisdiction
denied over state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress applied in state courts in
employment discrimination cases because punitive damages recoverable under state claim not
recoverable under Title VII); Wilkins v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 154, 154-55 (D. Kan. 1980) (pendent jurisdiction over state employment discrimination
claim denied because state supreme court had yet to resolve scope of remedies available under
state claim); Holden v. H.J. Heinz Co., 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 175, 178 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (pendent jurisdiction denied over state discriminatory employment law claim in part
because of lack of state supreme court guidance with which to adjudicate state claim).
138. 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 154 (D. Kan. 1980).
139. Id. at 154-55.
140. 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
141. Id. at 840.
142. Id.
143. 463 F. Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
144. Id. at 954.
145. See Cantania, State Employment Discrimination Remedies And Pendent Jurisdiction
Under Title VII: Access To Federal Courts, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 777, 801-02 & n.119 (1983)
(denying pendent jurisdiction forces plaintiff to institute two proceedings, one in federal court
and one in state court, and thereby creates undesired occurrence of piecemeal litigation).
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antidiscrimination claim, or to discard pursuit of the state claim.' 46 The
plaintiff who first brings his Title VII action in federal court might then
absorb the cost of the two simultaneous suits in state and federal court.1
47
Moreover, if the plaintiff, to avoid simultaneous suits, waits until the federal
court adjudicates the Title VII claim before the plaintiff files his state claim
in state court, the plaintiff runs the risk that the state statute of limitations
on the state claim will expire before the federal court resolves the Title VII
claim or that the federal court judgment by res judicata might preclude the
state court from adjudicating the state claim. 48 Alternatively, a plaintiff
having a state antidiscrimination employment law claim and a Title VII claim
arising from the same alleged discriminatory conduct could first pursue his
state claim in state court, but the Kremer decision would bar him from
bringing a subsequent Title VII action in federal court.' 4
9
Title VII pendent jurisdiction case law and the Kremer decision pose a
major problem to the plaintiff of a Title VII claim if federal courts alone
have exclusive jurisdiction of Title VII actions because the plaintiff might
then have to abandon either the Title VII claim or the state claim to avoid
either the cost of litigating in two forums, to discard the Title VII claim or
the state claim, to lose the cause of action on the state claim due to the
running of the statute of limitations, or to suffer preclusion of state court
adjudication of the state claim.' 50 Permitting the exercise of concurrent state
court jurisdiction over Title VII claims, however, would help the plaintiff to
avoid such problems.'-' Under a concurrent jurisdiction approach, the plain-
tiff could bring both his state employment discrimination claim and his Title
VII claim in state court in one action.'5 2 In so doing, the plaintiff does not
146. Id.
147. See id. (denial of pendent jurisdiction over state discriminatory employment claim in
Title VII action would require party seeking recovery under both state claim and Title VII
claims to initiate proceedings in state court and in federal court).
148. See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4468, at 648-54 (discussing numerous cases holding that
Constitution requires state courts to give full faith and credit to federal court judgments);
Cantania, supra note 145, at 785 n.32 (noting that statute of limitation period for bringing state
employment discrimination claims generally is only one year or less from time of alleged
discriminatory practice).
149. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-67, 483-85 (1982) (holding
that state court judgment on state discriminatory employment claim barred plaintiff from
bringing subsequent federal court Title VII action based on same alleged discriminatory conduct).
150. See Cantania, supra note 145, at 785, 801-02 & n.119 (urging grant of pendent
jurisdiction over state discriminatory employment claims in Title VII actions brought in federal
court).
151. See infra notes 153-57 and accompanying text (suggesting that granting state courts
concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions helps to relieve plaintiff of problems of costly
multiple suits, state statutes of limitations, choosing between discarding the Title VII claim and
the state claim, and concern over possible preclusion of state court jurisdiction of the state
claim).
152. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981) (concurrent
jurisdiction doctrine provides that a plaintiff may seek state court adjudication of a claim
arising under a federal statute).
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have to make the unsatisfactory choice between initiating two court actions
or discarding either his state claim or his Title VII claim. Without concurrent
jurisdiction, however, the plaintiff might reject his Title VII claim and pursue
his state claim because state remedies generally are broader than Title VII
relief. 53 Congress, moreover, surely did not intend plaintiffs to undermine
the federal interest of having federal statutes used actively and enforced
effectively, but such a result occurs when plaintiffs discard Title VII claims
in favor of pursuing broader state relief. Such vitiation of the effectiveness
of Title VII is especially unfair to the potential Title VII plaintiff because
state employment discrimination laws do not necessarily further federal
policy. Some states have either no employment discrimination statutes or
limited employment discrimination statutes, and common law remedies often
are more difficult to prove than Title VII remedies. 54 Consequently, depend-
ence on state law alone might result in the failure to remedy the wrong of
employment discrimination inflicted on the victim.
In determining whether the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction over Title
VII actions is incompatible with the furtherance of federal interests, and
thus prohibited under the Gulf test, the federal interest in uniformity of
interpretation and application of Title VII, and the need for federal judicial
expertise, requires consideration. The concern for uniformity of judgments
on actions arising under federal statutory law underlines the quest for
consistent precedent and public respect for the reliability and fairness of
American courts. 55 Inconsistent judgments make legal planning difficult.
5 6
Furthermore, inconsistency in judgments encourages a lack of public respect
in courts as dispute resolution forums because persons facing substantially
identical factual situations and seeking redress of wrongs under the same law
would for no apparent reason obtain redress of the wrongs in one court and
not in another court. 57 The concern for federal judicial expertise in inter-
preting and applying any particular federal statutory law demonstrates the
assumption that federal judges generally have had numerous occasions to
hear actions arising under the federal statutory law and therefore understand
the intricacies of that federal statutory law better than state judges would
153. See Cantania, supra note 145, at 784 (state employment discrimination remedies are
broader than Title VII remedies); see also supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (discussing
cases in which federal courts denied pendent jurisdiction because state discriminatory employ-
ment claims provided broader relief than Title VII claims).
154. See Cantania, supra note 145, at 782-88 (suggesting that many state laws require proof
of discriminatory intent, whereas Title VII does not require a showing of discriminatory intent
to make out a Title VII violation); id. at 783 n.24 (noting that Alabama does not have any
employment discrimination statute); TEx. REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-1612) (Vernon 1970)
(limited to injunctive relief generally available only upon a showing of irreparable injury).
155. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (applying doctrine of res judicata to
obtain consistency of federal court decisions).
156. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979) (increasing consistency in




understand the federal statutory law. 5 8 The uniformity argument used against
allowing concurrent state court jurisdiction of Title VII is that permitting
fifty different states and the twelve federal judicial circuits to render judg-
ments on Title VII instead of confining Title VII judgments to the twelve
federal circuits would result in less uniformity in the interpretation and
application of Title VII law." 9 Similarly, the federal judicial expertise argu-
ment cautioning against the grant of concurrent state court jurisdiction over
Title VII actions would be that state judges possess either local prejudice or
inexperience that would affect the state judge's ability to interpret and apply
Title VII law properly.'16 In Gulf, however, the Supreme Court upheld the
traditional presumptive right of state courts to adjudicate federal causes of
action, that state courts were effective forums for the vindication of federal
rights arising under federal laws, and that the Supreme Court was always
ready to review questionable state court judgments of federal claims.'
61
Moreover, the Title VII action has existed for more than twenty years, and
state court judges adjudicating Title VII actions would have more than
twenty years of federal Title VII case law from which to draw Title VII
precedent.' 62 Additionally, state court judges generally possess the equivalent
intellectual abilities of federal judges, and therefore state court judges should
not have any significant trouble in understanding and further developing
Title VII case law.
63
The preceding review of Title VII pendent jurisdiction case law, the
Kremer decision, and the need for uniformity and the use of judicial expertise
in the interpretation and application of federal statutory law demonstrates
that the furtherance of federal interests associated with Title VII is not
clearly incompatible with the existence of concurrent state court jurisdiction
over Title VII actions.'6 Under the third prong of the Supreme Court Gulf
concurrent jurisdiction test, the need for furtherance of federal interests
associated with a particular federal statute can bar state court adjudication
158. See Redish & Muench, supra note 1, at 312-13 (federal judges possess broad expertise
in dealing with intricacies of federal laws).
159. See id. at 331-34 & n.83 (suggesting that likelihood of uniformity in interpretation
and application of federal statutory law is greater if federal judges adjudicate such law rather
than state courts).
160. Id. at 312-13, 330.
161. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981) (state courts
are capable of vindicating federal rights under federal statutory law and Supreme Court has
power to review state court determinations of federal statutory claims).
162. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (originally enacted in 1964 as 42 U.S.C. §
2000e to 2000e-15 (1964)).
163. See Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, I1 HAsrINoS
CoNsr. L.Q. 165, 166, 185 (1984) (state judges deserve praise for their high competence in
safeguarding federal rights).
164. See supra notes 115-63 and accompanying text (discussing various federal policy
interests associated with Title VII and suggesting that granting state court jurisdiction over Title
VII actions is not clearly incompatible with maintenance of federal interests embodied in Title
Vii).
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of actions arising under the statute only if a clear incompatibility exists
between the maintenance of the federal interests and the exercise of state
court jurisdiction over the statute. 61 Since furtherance of the federal interests
associated with Title VII is not clearly incompatible with the exercise of
concurrent state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions, application of the
federal interest prong of the Gulf test to the Title VII concurrent jurisdiction
issue does not preclude concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII actions.'6
Permitting state courts concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII claims
satisfies not only the third prong of the Supreme Court's Gulf concurrent
jurisdiction test concerning furtherance of federal interests, 67 but, as noted,
also satisfies the statutory language and legislative history portions of the
three part Gulf concurrent jurisdiction test. 6 The Gulf concurrent jurisdic-
tion test provides that only explicit statutory language, unmistakable impli-
cation from legislative history, or clear incompatibility between state court
jurisdiction and federal policy interests associated with a federal statute will
bar a state court from adjudicating an action arising under that statute.
69
As demonstrated, the statutory language of Title VII carries no explicit
mandate of exclusive federal court jurisdiction of Title VII actions. 70 More-
over, the sparse legislative history of Title VII conveys only uncertainty
concerning whether Congress intended to limit adjudication of Title VII
165. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981).
166. See id. (federal interests associated with federal statute do not preclude state court
jurisdiction of claims arising under that statute unless clear incompatibility exists between
granting of such jurisdiction and furtherance of federal interests); supra notes 115-63 and
accompanying text (discussing various federal policy interests associated with Title VII and
suggesting that granting state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions is not clearly incompatible
with furtherance of federal interests embodied in Title VII).
167. See supra notes 115-63 and accompanying text (discussing various federal policy
interests associated with Title VII and suggesting that, under Gulf concurrent jurisdiction test,
granting concurrent state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions is not clearly incompatible
with furtherance of federal interests embodied in Title VII).
168. See Gulf, 453 U.S. at 478 (only explicit statutory language, unmistakable implication
from legislative history, or clear incompatibility between granting state courts concurrent
jurisdiction over federal statute and maintenance of federal interests associated with federal
statute precludes state court from adjudicating claims arising under the statute); supra notes 12-
89 and accompanying text (applying Gulf concurrent jurisdiction test to analysis of Title VII
statutory language and concluding that no explicit statutory language in Title VII exists to
preclude concurrent state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions); supra notes 92-113 and
accompanying text (applying Gulf concurrent jurisdiction test to analysis of legislative history
of Title VII and concluding that nothing in Title VII's legislative history conveys an unmistakable
implication to deny concurrent state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions).
169. See Gulf, 453 U.S. at 478 (only explicit statutory language, ummistakable implication
from legislative history, or clear incompatibility between exercise of concurrent state court
jurisdiction and furtherance of federal interests associated with federal cause of action rebuts
presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction over the federal cause of action).
170. See supra notes 11-88 and accompanying text (suggesting that statutory language of
Title VII carries no explicit mandate of exclusive federal court jurisdiction of Title VII actions).
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actions exclusively to federal courts.' 7' Finally, granting state courts concur-
rent jurisdiction over Title VII not only results in clear compatibility with
federal interests associated with Title VII, but in some circumstances actually
furthers federal interests. 72 Since application of the Gulf concurrent juris-
diction test to Title VII demonstrates that state courts should have concurrent
jurisdiction over Title VII actions, the Title VII plaintiff therefore should
have the option of bringing his Title VII action either in state or federal
court.
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171. See supra notes 92-113 and accompanying text (suggesting that legislative history of
Title VII does not convey unmistakable implication of congressional intent to preclude concur-
rent state court jurisdiction of Title VII actions).
172. See supra notes 118-71 and accompanying text (suggesting that exercise of concurrent
state court jurisdiction over Title VII actions is not clearly incompatible with furtherance of
federal interests associated with Title VII).
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